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ABSTRACT-

In 1992, Maxine Hairston's "Diversity, Ideology, and
Teaching Writing" claimed that instead of teaching writing

and critical thinking skills, First Year Composition (FYC)

instructors were instead using their classrooms as coercive

political platforms that were detrimental to students'
educational needs.

Hairston's solution was to limit writing

classrooms only to student-text production.

This thesis

enters the discussion at this point by exploring Hairston's
position, explicating the practices of those instructors
Hairston claims indoctrinate students, critiquing the theory
Hairston condemns for supporting those practices, and

finally explaining possible ways to distinguish between
teaching critical political and social inquiry and advancing
lopsided political agendas in FYC classrooms.

Findings

conclude that although the use of political material does

increase the possibility of coercive teaching practices,
social-epistemic rhetoric (the primary theory proposing the
use of political material in FYC) does not encourage

political or social indoctrination.

Furthermore, social-

epistemic rhetoric expands on traditional composition
theories and practices by including multiple perspectives on

controversial topics, an understanding of discourse as

social and political, and a shift in traditional power

iii

relationships between students and instructors, all of
which, as argued in this thesis, are necessary for

productive critical inquiry into social and political
discussions.

Conclusions maintain, contrary to Hairston,

that as long as certain criteria are utilized, FYC is a

legitimate environment for discussions concerning political
and social topics.
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CHAPTER ONE
HAIRSTON'S POSITION

Instructors and administrators' assumptions regarding

what makes writing instruction "good" often are anchored in
firm but unarticulated beliefs, experiences, and

actions—what Stephen North refers to as "teaching lore."

This uniquely positions the study of writing in the academy.
Unlike science or math, where curricula and assessment are

often agreed upon and universalized, composition scholars
and teachers have rarely been able to agree upon a single
set of effective and appropriate strategies for teaching
writing.

As a result, conflicting scholarly theories and an

emphasis on pedagogical research riddle the field of

composition; in fact, no other college discipline, aside

from educational theory, pays as much attention to pedagogy

as does composition studies, nor does any discipline
disagree as much about instructional practices as do

composition scholars and practitioners.
Contributing to composition's disagreement on
scholarship and practice, writing is rarely isolated.

Instead, writing is understood through relationships with
other "borrowed" subjects that help facilitate the skills

necessary to reinforce the different elements of writing.
Because of this, and for the purposes of this thesis,
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writing pedagogy will be examined in two categories: the

specific principles of writing and the subjects or vehicles
through which those principles are facilitated (for similar
distinctions, see Brodkey's "visible and invisible

curricula"

(193)).

I will refer to the former category as

the primary curriculum and the latter as the secondary

curriculum.

The primary curriculum assumes qualities that

can be found within the structure and style of writing

itself: diction, form, syntax, mechanics, rhetoric,
argumentative structure (deductive/inductive reasoning,

supportive evidence), etc., while the qualities of a
secondary curriculum include the examined topic (literature,

feminism, foreign policy), along with its particular

conventions.

For example, the secondary curriculum may

include reading, understanding, and responding to a variety

of sources on multiculturalism, from which students may

derive an essay on twenty-first century suburban racism.
The primary curriculum then includes the writing objectives

encouraged by these activities.
Over the years, debates over the intersection of

composition's primary and secondary curriculum have created

much controversy.

White and Polin's 1986 California Report

exemplifies the contention between primary and secondary
curricula in its six most common patterns of composition
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instruction: 1. Literature Approach.
Approach.

3.

Peer Workshop

Individualized Writing Lab Approach.

Text-Based Rhetoric Approach.

6.

2.

Service Course Approach.

4.

Basic Skills Approach.

5.

The six approaches, however,

reduce writing instruction to three basic assumptions: 1.

Writing should discuss student texts (primary curriculum

only); 2.

Writing should discuss professional writings

(primary curriculum is taught through a secondary
curriculum); 3.

Writing can be reduced to its respective

parts and should therefore consist of instruction in correct

grammar and usage (White 42-44).

The classic

Elbow/Bartholomae debate over "writers" and "academics"

articulates the theoretical parity of the first two, while
the third, almost in contempt of consistent findings on non-

inclusive grammar instruction, speaks simply to the
difficulty and frustration instructors encounter when

reading error-filled student texts.

Currently, as in the past, all three vie to become the
vanguard of composition instruction.

However, both current

traditionalism and expressivism, particularly in their pure
forms, have lost favor with contemporary scholars.

For

example, although many compositionists believe that personal

writing is an important element of good writing, most

composition scholars at least envision a need for students
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to understand and participate within the academic

stadium—rife with conventions, forms, voices, and ideas that
are often alien to students and consequently important for
their participation within the academy.

Few contest the

importance of this kind of practical orientation to post
secondary education.

Yet, as composition courses enter the

domain of other disciplines, genres, and political provinggrounds, issues surrounding the bias present in these
secondary curricula become more endemic to the conversation.

The slow demise of current traditionalism, the myopia
Of expressivism, and the greater acceptance of postmodern
theories such as social-epistemic rhetoric (and the

community of voices and influences it represents) have led
compositionists to devote more instructional time to essay

content (Brodkey 193).

In turn, this places a greater

responsibility on instructors to teach critical thinking

within the context of multiple discourses and their
discordant social and political voices, a skill that is

often expected of instructors but is usually neglected in

pedagogical training and traditionally in theory as well.

Adding to this responsibility, during the last decade, as
composition curricula have become more politicized (Hairston
180), composition theory has battled to stay abreast and is

only recently—within the last decade or so—struggling with
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the importance of distinguishing between critical thinking
and pushing preset political/social ideologies (Halasek
117) .

Perhaps the most controversial article on the topic,
Maxine Hairston's Diversity, Ideology, and Teaching Writing

criticizes compositionists for inundating First Year

Composition (FYC) with overt leftist political ideologies:
I see a new model emerging for freshman writing
programs, a model that disturbs me greatly.

It's

a model that puts dogma before diversity, politics
before craft, ideology before critical thinking,
and the social goals of the teacher before the

educational needs of the student [. .

.

.] It's a

model that doesn't take freshman English seriously
in its own right but conceives of it as a tool,

something to be used [. . .

. Everywhere I turn I

find composition faculty, both leaders in the

profession and new voices, asserting that they
have not only the right, but the duty, to put
ideology and radical politics at the center of
their teaching.

(180)

Although the article met with indignation from many

composition scholars, who argued that classrooms were
inevitably political and that Hairston's -attack itself was
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political rather than scholarly, the distinction she implies

between encouraging critical thinking and advocating preset

ideological agendas raises an important concern in

Composition instruction and scholarship.

Because FYC

classrooms claim the responsibility of encouraging critical
thinking, and because critical'thinking is more recently

being taught through social and/or political ideologies, the
line between setting an agenda and encouraging critical
inquiry can be dangerously thin.

Thus, this study proposes

to explore Hairston's criticism of composition's political
and ideological positioning, to explicate the practices of

the theorists she claims "cross over the line," to critique
the theory she condemns for supporting these practices, and
ultimately to conclude, based on these findings, what are

and what are not constructive ways of distinguishing between
teaching critical political and social inquiry and advancing

lopsided political agendas in the FYC classroom.

Hairston opens her article with allusions to a variety

of scholars whom she accuses of "[.

.

.] asserting that they

have not only the right, but the duty, to put ideology and
radical politics at the center of their teaching"

(180) .

She calls on linguist John Searle for support, who concurs,

stating that
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The most congenial home left for Marxism

. .]

is in the departments of literary criticism [. .

.

M] any professors [,.. .] teach it as a means of

achieving left-wing political goals or as an
occasion for exercises in deconstruction.

(Searle

38)

Hairston validates Searle's position, blaming critical
literary theories such as deconstruction, post

structuralism, and Marxist critical theory for "[.

.

.]

trickl[ing] down to the lower floors of English

departments," and that the justification for using these
theories in FYC classrooms are "[.

and undemonstrable"

(184-5).

.

. ] silly, simplistic,

She continues, charging that

the goals met through these theories push students to see

English as the "[.

.

.] dialect of the dominant class [. . .

that] merely reinforces the status quo and serves the
interest of the dominant class" instead of helping students

master the standard dialect, which she posits is a more
constructive, realistic, and less politicized goal (185).
As a solution, Hairston proffers a twofold schema:.
First, students' own writing must be the center of

the course.

Students need to write to find out

how much they know and to gain confidence in their

ability to express themselves effectively [. . .
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.] Second, as writing teachers we should stay

within our area of professional expertise: helping
students to learn to write in order to learn, to

explore, to communicate, to gain control over

their lives [. . . .] We have no business getting
into areas where we may have passion and

conviction but no scholarly base from which to

operate.

(187)

Hairston's position is accurate insofar as FYC, like any

other course, should not become a forum for political and
social indoctrination.

In most universities and colleges,

FYC is a mandatory course used to introduce students to

writing at the post-secondary level.

To use the class to

"enlighten" students about the benighted position of various
li'minal groups or to force them into seeing the inherent

oppressiveness of capitalism is, as Hairston claims, to "[.

.

. ] severely limit [. . . the] freedom of expression for

(191) while relegating FYC to

both students and instructors"

nothing more than eighteen weeks of exactly the kind of
closed-ended investigations and argumentation that FYC is
assumed to remedy.

The difficulty, however, exists when FYC is divided

into its respective functions.

On many college and

university campuses, FYC is used to introduce students to
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academic forms, styles, structures, language communities,
grammatical conventions, and perhaps some of the concepts

they will encounter in their other courses.

In addition,

FYC is expected to introduce students to writing as an

exploration, to understanding and using various rhetorical
devices, and to very specific levels of analysis, critical
inquiry, and support necessary to proactively complicate the

political and social ideologies students encountered in
their secondary education.

In other words, composition

courses are often given the duty of teaching students how to

critically investigate a topic—something that is difficult
to . facilitate without the various ideological positions of
other academic and/or professional writers.

Hairston's antidote for the political pressure of
influential writers and the teachers who may espouse their
theories is to establish a student-centered curriculum,

where students draw from their own experience for writing
topics.

To exemplify her aims, she creates a fictional

Malawi student who discusses tribal legends of his homeland
and the significance of the ivory bracelet he wears on his

arm (192).

The student, I assume, will tell the story of

his heritage, highlighting the significance of the bracelet,
then attempt to make that knowledge important to others who
may be interested.

On one hand, because the topic is
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student-generated (with the student being the assumed

authority), the sample assignment does to some degree

safeguard teachers from espousing political/social
ideologies.

This, in turn, also neutralizes students'

tendencies to follow the political ideologies of the
instructor for a grade, because the only agenda established

will be the student's own.

The assignment could, in fact,

also generate more interest than one assigned by the
instructor, as, at least theoretically, students will write

on what interests them most—all of which are important
considerations for FYC instructors.

The problem, however, still lies in the expectations
of a FYC class.

As stated earlier, FYC is more than

functional literacy or basic skills.

Most composition

classes have either a basic writing prerequisite or a

placement score that assumes students are already to a large
Although they purport to

degree functionally literate.

address issues of coherence, punctuation, proofreading, and
editing, many colleges and universities focus the class on

improving students' ability to write intelligently, and to

read, think, respond, and write reflectively about what they
read.

Thus, writing at the college- level means more than

form, grammar, and reiterating what students have already
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learned; in short, writing classrooms become a space for the

early stages of scholarship and intellectual struggle.

One essential element, and perhaps the only generally
accepted tie to the different disciplines of post-secondary

scholarship, is the presence of conflicting ideas, which are

also at the root of critical thinking and ideological
formation.

Although Hairston does indeed mention critical

thinking and its importance in her article, she excludes
political and social theories from this lens, because of the

dangers of inculcation they present.

However, she assumes

that these theories will be touted without complication.

If

she is correct and these theories are maintained without

multiple voices, then I would agree with Hairston's fears,
because, without challenge, political and social theories
can be maintained without complexity, and students' choices
are left to the whims of creativity and belief.

Thinking

critically about any topic shapes the way it is constructed,
deconstructed, and then reconstructed with a more
knowledgeable base of information from which to speak and

make further inquiry.

Traditionally, critical thought

requires students to at the very least find a position

(thesis statement), while mustering requisite evidence to
support the discovery of new information and conclusions
(Brodkey 236).

To take this further and situate it within
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the specific influence of social and political theories,

students' claims, if conflicting voices are present, become
partial and provisional statements about the world.

Without

the presence of other voices, their positions become stacked

claims masquerading as unarguable and immutable truths with
which readers must either agree or disagree whole-heartedly
(Brodkey 236).

In this situation, if they do not consider

dissenting points of view, students risk leaving the

argument without having examined it from more than one

position, a move that leaves students without the critical
and rhetorical authority needed for sustained inquiry into
difficult topics.

Including a variety of dissenting

arguments on the same issue "[. . .] encourages students to
step back and walk around a proposition, examining its

construction and looking, in particular, for the gaps and

fissures, the telltale signs of covert interests, dogmas,
and desires"

(Fitts and France 15).

political issues [.

.

Thus, "Avoiding

.] even if possible, would fail to

engage students in those very rhetorical practices that
articulate and validate knowledge"

(15).

This conclusion, however, may present the dangers for

which Hairston condemns many current writing programs.
Hairston concludes, instead of- allowing a fair and

substantial range of diverse interpretations of topics,
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As

composition teachers, because of their own political biases,
may inevitably force those biases onto students as the
correct or plausible answer to the topic, even if several

conflicting voices are present.

Or, presenting even more of

a danger, students will pick up the hints of bias and

attempt to parrot that point of view.

possible.

Either of these is

Yet, the question is whether this is as dangerous

or as universal as Hairston claims.
An ideological stance, according to Hairston, only
includes the student's or teacher's position without the

validation of other perspectives; thus, Hairston uses

ideology as a four-letter word, connecting it to phrases
like "radical politics" or opposing it with undefined

notions of critical thinking (180), both of which relegate
ideology to the level of dangerous opinions and/or
unsupported beliefs.

Although the word has these

connotations, if taken literally, ideology lays out a
pattern of argumentation that supports its conclusions and

discloses its weaknesses.

In other words, exposing an

ideology would not only highlight the conclusions but also

the premises, their sources, the construction and ordering
of those sources, and the inferences drawn to form the

conclusion(s).

If taken in their complexity rather than

their ends, ideologies become the intellectual spaces for
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negotiating claims and information, " [.

.

. that] provide [.

.

. ] environments [.

. .] a continual source of critical

tension (Fritts and France 22).

In other words, if

instructors are to take an ideological stance on an issue,
all of the elements of that stance should be laid out

together with the conclusions as a position for students to
negotiate in and around instead of as absolute truths.

ideology, therefore, must necessarily "[. .

The

.] view [. . .]

argumentation as a prologue to further inquiry [. .

.

instead of] as performances that invariably end with winners
and losers, and, ultimately, in silence"

(Brodkey 236).

This does, however, require instructors to relinquish a

significant amount of authority in the classroom, as their

ideological positions become as unstable as their students'.
Although few compositionists would openly discourage
students from becoming critical readers of difficult
texts—as this allows them to position and negotiate within

the dissenting views of an argument—what may be less obvious
but more dangerous is when instructors indirectly discourage
students from critiquing the instructor's authority, which
can be looked at as its own text.

Thus, the double standard

of asking students to be critical of all ideological
positions except the instructor's may contribute to the

mimicry that Hairston posits.

To defend a position as
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immutable truth sends a twofold message to students: 1) that

knowledge is static once it is described by an authority or

institution, and 2) that critical inquiry is based on
unwarranted assumptions that reduce education to a game of

inquiry only to the point that students reach prescribed
conclusions.

Thereby, students' only inquiry is into the

instructor's biases, and making the grade becomes knowing

the roads that the instructor took to get there.

This is

especially dangerous if the instructor does not fully
recognize the bias present in his/her own position, or if
the instructor's biases are constructed under a more

elaborate and less visible umbrella of weakly-supported

claims that work together to equal a narrow, immutable
vision of a particular topic.

Recently, during one of my FYC classes, I queried
students on what the introductory lectures to the class had

to do with writing in general.

The preceding lectures had

been rough political critiques paired with a quick probing

into students' understanding of and access to information

from a variety of popular media.

I used two primary

examples of which I was sure few students were aware: the

fairly recent and successful protest against President

Clinton's Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) and
President George W. Bush's "Gag Order" on giving federal
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monies to international free clinics who discuss abortion as

a reproductive alternative.

My initial intent was to show

how superficial information or a lack of information

altogether could lead to a disparate reading when compared

to a deeper look at a variety of sources.

On a larger

scale, I wanted to provide students with a broad-strokes
look at their responsibilities as FYC students and as

students becoming scholars, as their task would be to take
headlines and bylines (surface readings), understand their

initial reactions to them, then complicate their reactions
with further research and a revision of their original

position.

Ultimately, students had to compare their "gut"

reactions to their "informed" understanding of the topic and
discuss the changes and the reasons behind them.

However democratic I assumed the lectures and the
assignment to be—after all, I was using presidents from both

popular parties, and my only bias seemed against a lack of
investigative integrity on the part of the media—when
questioning the students as to what this had to do with the

class or with writing in general, one brave soul raised her
hand and said, "It seems your class has some kind of

political agenda."

Although I quickly explained that the only political
agenda I had for the class was for students to become
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active, critical participants in an ongoing conversation, I
felt for the first time that any suggestion of political

content could, as Hairston presents, be viewed as
politically dangerous and that I, in turn, could be viewed

as an ideologue, pushing an unwarranted agenda onto students
who did not wish to or who should, not wish to accept it.
More importantly, however, I began to question what Kay

Halasek explains as "The unexamined assumption [. .

.] that

people who take the time and make the effort to become
informed will necessarily turn to critique what the critical

pedagogues themselves define as injustice, discrimination,
or oppression"

(118) .

Said another way, although I wanted

students to become critically engaged with issues that had

multiple viewpoints, I was also pushing that they accept
politics as inherently corrupt and media as the vehicle for
maintaining that corruption.

Looking back at some of the old essays I have kept from
previous classes, I begin to understand that although the
comments suggest a variety of stances on the arguments and
support surrounding the issues, I do pressure students to

accept my world view that power is corrupt and oppressive,

that social systems can work to reduce corruption and
inequality, and that critical engagement—with a bias toward

corporations and government—is essential to a functional
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democracy.

In short, I push an ideology, and although I am

critical with those students who share my views, I am less

so than with those who dissent.
In my defense, I could call on aid from resistance

pedagogues such as Paulo Freire, bell hooks, Patricia
Bizzell, Nancy Welsh, etc. to validate my position.
However, to do so would be more of a justification than an

exploration, with the obvious conclusion that what I have
been doing is morally, politically, and theoretically

sustainable.

Instead, I posit that my own ideology,

although perhaps better supported than many students', is as

fraught with emotional and political bias as any other.

The

difficulty, of course, is what to do with that
understanding.

To simply state my bias, as I did to some

extent when my student raised the issue, is not enough to
dispel the possibility that students will mimic me for the

grade.

Yet, the fact that some students are willful enough

to stage such resistance may contribute to a resolution.

According to Kay Halasek, "Coming to critical awareness
(and with it critical reading and writing ability) is a
process constrained by social forces and institutions"

(119).

Inversely, critical awareness is a process unbound

by those same forces and institutions.

Said another way,

confinement exists only in relation to freedom; the converse

18

is true as well.

Thus, an inmate who has lived a year in

solitary confinement will recognize the need for freedom in

a variety of ways different from one whose confinement
consists of the general prison population.

Each one,

depending on the severity of the punishment, will recognize
freedom as a set of rules that s/he must abide by, or, in
other terms, in relation to what s/he can or cannot get away
with.

Students in FYC are under similar circumstances

insofar as they enter at differing levels of "ideological
becoming," with diverse levels and means of negotiating
authoritarian discourse (qtd. in Halasek 120).

Some

students have already developed rigid ideologies, while

others are still searching for theories to support their
world experience.

In either case, compositionists have a

responsibility to offer "[. . .] situated writing through

which a student struggles to engage and orient herself and
her beliefs," even though the acquired ends may differ

significantly from student to student (emphasis Halasek
120).

The assumption that instructors can understand the

sundry ways students will put their FYC experiences to later

use supports an egotistical fallacy that works only as far

as it justifies the instructor's practices.

Students,

though walking out of our classes with similar skills, will

put those skills to a variety of purposes suited to their
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needs.

Thus, students entering FYC, though perhaps ignorant

of those purposes at the time, will utilize the class

depending on how they understand their own needs, strengths,
and deficits in writing and thinking.

For some, the class

entails reading with and thereby understanding texts.

For

others, who may have developed a critical stance against
authority, the class will become a "resistant form of

discourse"

(124).

The composition instructor then becomes

another text in which students, depending on their critical
outlook, will accept as "the authority" or as simply another

position with which students must negotiate.

According to William Perry and Mary Belenky et al.,
students move through a relatively systematic intellectual
and ethical development that begins with a basic duality and
ends with a kind of ethical relativism.

"Each stage in the

process represents a different epistemological mode or

stance through which students progress in their roles as
learners"

(Halasek 129).

Those at the earlier stages of

their development may tend to, as Hairston suggests, "mimic"

the texts they encounter as they attempt to appropriate the
language and ideas present.

Those who have moved beyond

that position will continue "[ . . .] building their own
self-knowledge, achieving a sense of autonomy and individual

voice, a sense of independent choice within a socially
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constructed world"

(130).

Consequently, instructors are

left in a somewhat precarious position as they ultimately
have little to do with the way students interact with the
information they receive.

Some students may in fact parrot

the instructor, and therefore the instructor's ideologies,

while others will already understand the instructor as one
voice contributing to a variety of voices on an issue.
What instructors can do, however, is contribute to

students' critical development by presenting information in

a way that invites critical responses that move beyond a
dualistic stance rather than allowing students to sit idle
with their initial presumptions. Hairston's Malawi student's

report, for example, offers no critical way into the

material except through the form and style of the student's
prose.

These elements are important to forming those

skills, but the instruction lacks any attempt to help

students move beyond a dualistic response, since the "[.

.

.] process of critical reading [and thinking], defined as an

inquiry into one's relationship with a text [subject] and

its hero [position], entails both passive reception and
active engagement"

(131).

Paramount to this process, as

Peter Elbow suggests, is information that invites students

to both "doubt and believe"

(131) .

Hairston's Malawi

student seems to require only the latter, both for the
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student writing and for the listening audience, since to
engage the writer critically, the audience would have to
possess an insight on the subject greater than that which I

expect most students'have concerning Malawi customs.

To contain the class within the narrow scope of
students' personal preferences and interests seems to renege

on composition's promise to create challenging environments
rich in diverse perspectives.

This also indirectly tells

students that the kinds of writing they will encounter
during their tenure will be nothing more than personal

storytelling, and that their audiences will be as forgiving ■

of them as were their uninformed classmates, or that their
instructors will remain socially and politically neutral on
the topics they choose to write.

These assumptions, as any

student or instructor knows, are false.

Students

encountering any political and social discourse will be
forced to renegotiate personal bias, to include a variety of

conflicting voices on the subject, and to construct an
ideology based on that information.

To assume that there

will be no obstruction to their theories if their prose are

merely error-free and coherent is like looking at a
difficult situation and suddenly declaring oneself blind.
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CHAPTER TWO
EXAMINING OTHER VOICES
As established in chapter one, productive critical
inquiry into political and social topics within a FYC course

depends upon multiple, dissonant voices competing for
ideological acceptance.

In this context, students' critical

tasks are to wade through these voices and understand the

-parameters of a given discussion, to create an initial
position on the topic, and to enter the conversation, with

the attendant responsibility of synthesizing the voices with
their own to come to a logical, provisional stance on the

topic.

In doing so, students' nascent views are complicated

to form more Sophisticated ideologies.

The intersection for

further controversy, however, is if and in what ways

instructors' ideologies directly or indirectly influence the
kind of lop-sided advocacy that Hairston claims,- or whether

the presence of this influence facilitates the kind of fair
handed inquiry that is required to challenge students within
competing discourses.

Using the- above criteria for

analysis, this chapter will explicate four of the theorists.
Hairston claims use the classroom as a political platform to
the detriment of students' own ideological becoming.
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As suggested previously, even if the deck of the class

is stacked in favor of a particular ideological stance, some

students, based on the fact that they are intelligent,
thinking adults with the capacity to form well-supported
ideologies, will challenge the instructor's biases and

authority and, contrary to Hairston's claims, come to their

own conclusions after reasoning through the position and/or

rhetorical power of the instructor.

However, only highly

skilled, sophisticated, and determined students are likely

to successfully do so, given certain social realities of the
classroom—i.e. the instructor is the final judge of

students' abilities and therefore has - the power to accept or
reject the validity of students' positions.

Regardless of

their sophistication, students also come to their classrooms
assuming that because teachers are the governing, educated

authority, students are there to learn what instructors have

to teach.

In addition, what students are required to learn

is often blurred by the confusing overlap of primary and
secondary curricula.

For example, if the class is

established around the theme of technology, does that mean
students need to become, proficient users of technology?
quasi-scholars on technology issues?

or all of the above?

proficient writers?

And, does a passing grade mean

assuming the instructor's potentially biased views on
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technology? or, merely supporting a view on technology
within the governing bodies of knowledge already established
on the subject?

To freshman, who think their FYC classes

are going to be about "writing," understanding the various

permutations of the class in the short span of ten to
eighteen weeks while learning to write clear, concise,

coherent, well-supported academic essays may be more than

they can handle—especially if the course objectives are
couched in vague or confusing terms.

In this environment,

instructors' biases can be seductive alternatives for

students who feel like they are flailing inside a

conversation that is over their heads, with interlocutors—
authors and instructors—who are way out of their league,

especially (and this is the rub) when those authorities may
not play fairly.

Whether we like it or not, instructors

have the power of veto; unlike students' arguments,

teachers' arguments do not always require adequate support.
Thus, within this tricky maze of value, support, and
authority, Hairston's claims take on more validity.

Given

an environment that is particularly fertile for acceptance
and indoctrination, compositionists may in fact commandeer

their students' ideologies directly or indirectly by
asserting weighted political and social ideologies.
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To support her position, Hairston invokes four popular

composition scholars, whom she cites as both representative
of the field and part of the "[.

.

.] cultural left [who

have] claimed writing courses as their political territory"

(184).

The first of these theorists, Dale Bauer, according

to Hairston, not only politicizes her course with a feminist
agenda but then dismisses her students' resistance to the
theories as nothing more than compliance within "the

system." Bauer's article, "The Other 'F' Word: The Feminist
in the Classroom," justifies some of Hairston's claims

insofar as Bauer's political affiliation at times works to
dismiss her students' positions as arbitrary or worse, in
need of political "enlightenment."

As for the strengths of Bauer's class, establishing the

lens of feminism within the course legitimately challenges
students to see the world through a narrow perspective

founded on specific governing assumptions, and thereby, it
teaches the difficult lesson of analysis, a skill all

students will find useful in other classes and in their
lives.

For example, Bauer may ask her students to analyze a

particular article or situation while assuming a feminist's
position and the attendant doctrines that govern it.

This

kind of practice is important and does not on its surface
represent any particular bias.
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Furthermore, its particular

utility comes from the fact that many of the essays students

write for classes in and outside the humanities will ask

them to take one or several theories and apply them to a
particular situation.

The practice also asks students—who

often operate within the guidelines of personal experience.,

beliefs, and traditions—to see the world through a different
perspective, which is useful in helping them reposition

their argumentative stance in respect to social bodies of
knowledge, a key element to productive analysis and critical
Inquiry.

One of the theoretically challenging aspects of Bauer's
class, however, is that she seems to take analysis one step
further by asking her students to accept feminism not merely

as one of several possible lenses or ways of looking at
society but as the correct perspective, without offering
them any constructive ways of criticizing the social theory.

In other words, she asks students to be critical of the
hegemony but not of the authority that she maintains on the

subject.

For example, Bauer states, and I agree with her on

this point, that "Precisely because [students] insist on
[the separation between private or personal and the public
space]', our.first task should be to show the personal is
public"

(385).

Part of students' resistance to theoretical

discussions is based on the individual exceptions they see
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in just about any theoretical framework presented.
Especially regarding feminism, these individual exceptions
will be particularly insistent, since, as Bauer suggests,

feminism is often "[. .

.] identified with an alien,

radical, and threatening political position"

(386).

Yet,

Bauer strains the course's integrity when she asks, "[. . .]
how do we move ourselves out of this political impasse and
resistance in order to get our students to identify with the
political agenda of feminism?"- (387).

Although I, too, have

seen the sudden and often aggressive resistance to offering
feminism as a valuable socio-political stance, I would also

contend that feminism, like any other conglomerate of social

theories, "[.

.

.] has its own inevitable limitations, which

render it part of the dialogue of rhetorical statements
rather than a transcendent position looking piously down

upon an otherwise benighted fray"

(Knoblauch 136).

Thus,

Bauer's position suggests some level of coercion, as it

looks for ways to persuade students to identify with, rather

than critique, the feminist perspective.

Furthermore, when

students do engage in resistance, Bauer pigeon-holes their

opposition by suggesting that "[. .

.] students seem often

quite unambiguously committed to the 'system'"(387).

I

would posit here that their commitment is much more than
unambiguous or "ambivalent," as Bauer also claims.
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In order for students to accept feminism as an accurate

depiction of American culture and institutions, they must
first accept—depending on the different school of feminist

theory—that American social, political, and corporate
institutions are partriarchal, sexist, and oppressive,
premises that are easy to exemplify but difficult to prove,

especially to someone (male or female) who is sitting in a

college classroom (American social institution) on his/her
way to what s/he sees as a successful career.

That in

itself may appear contrary to what the feminist instructor

is saying.

To take it to the statistical level, if students

look around, or move beyond the classroom in their research,

they will also find that college populations around the
country are, based on those numbers, equally

balanced—tipping slightly in favor of the females.

This, in

turn, implies that men and women are both equally empowered
to move on to compete in the job market and thereby choose
careers that are based not on their gender but according to
their qualifications.

This is not say that this is a

complete, view of feminism, American educational
institutions, or corporate hiring practices.

Much more

research is necessary to support this claim; it does,

however, confirm a valid angle students may see and feel

compelled to study in terms of understanding gender equality
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To me, this level of inquiry proves

in higher learning.

useful in the context of critical thinking, because it not
only questions the so-called hegemony but feminism as well.

The example also supports the notion that because students

should be rightfully leery of accepting assumptions without

adequate support, Bauer's class needs to at least study
students' resistance to feminism as a potentially valid and

supportable position.

Furthermore, I could validate Bauer's position if the
course was an introduction to feminism.

However, it is not.

It is governed instead by the pedagogical assumptions of a
writing classroom.

Although, as stated before, those

assumptions are malleable, what is imperative is that the
secondary curriculum should be a means to improve critical

inquiry and writing rather than an end to justify the
political platform of the instructor.

Bauer agrees on the

surface, at least when she claims to foster critical

thinking, but the agreement is complicated when she also
proposes offering the goal of "emancipatory critical action"

(389).

The word emancipation means freedom from constraint;

it does not, however, include a definition of those
constraints.

Although no realistic writing class should

allow students absolute freedom, emancipation can mean
freedom from a feminist construct, especially if established
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within the context of FYC and its goals of teaching analysis

and critical thinking.

This does not mean that students can

merely react to feminism with half-cocked, home-grown

truisms and prejudice and be allowed to establish that

perspective based on a- whim.

It does, on the other hand,

mean that resistance to feminism is a. possible ideological
position for students to legitimately attempt to argue.

One could reasonably argue that other classes do not
offer students the choice to disagree with their theories,

so why should Bauer's class be any different, especially
given students' general ignorance of the tenets of feminism?

The answer lies both in the subject being taught and in the
situated position of FYC.

In a "content" course,

instructors are advertised as scholars specializing in the
course's subject and therefore are assumed to be familiar
with the dominant and competing theories informing the

topic, as well as with their limitations.

If these

instructors wish to promote critical’ analysis of the
competing theories in their disciplines, then they too have

the responsibility of including multiple perspectives on the

topic.

However, their positions are different to the extent

they are not always expected to teach critical thinking, as
is composition.

Because of the students' expectations of a

composition course, and because of the critical goals that
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most composition courses claim- to help facilitate, secondarycurricula is, by default, not governed solely by the
instructor but by the authority of the collective audience.

In this way, the accuracy or truth regarding the theories

studied becomes contextualized and relative, based on

relevant support and justification of the participants,
instead of on mimicry and regurgitation of the hegemonic

views.
Still, Bauer, as well as Patricia Bizzell—one of the

other four implicated in Hairston's article—view this
position as somewhat wrong-headed or inhumane, claiming that

teaching critical thinking without promoting an ideology
inadvertently asks students to be critical of theories
without giving them something to believe.

Bauer states, "In

my defense, I would say, following Charles Paine, that we
[teachers who promote an agenda] must accept our roles as
rhetoricians"

(.388) .

Bizzell concurs and supports baldly

indoctrinating students, arguing that critical thinking does
not offer anything for students to believe in beyond anti-

foundationalism and its ambivalent conclusion, ethical

relativism.

As Bizzell states,

We exercise authority over [students] in asking

them to give up these foundational beliefs, but we
give them nothing to put in the place of these
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-foundational beliefs because we deny the validity
of all authority, including, presumably, our own.

(670)
Bauer takes this one step further, introducing feminism as

the lost key to the puzzle:
It is not enough to foster critical thinking; we
need to suggest something in the place of what we
tear down when we ask students to resist cultural

hegemony [....] In short, I would argue that
political commitment—especially feminist

commitment—is a legitimate classroom strategy and
rhetorical imperative.

The feminist agenda offers

a goal towards our students' conversions to
emancipatory critical action.

(389)

The implications of this interchange are as frightening as

they are.complex.

There is no doubt that ethical relativism

for students is much like feeling schizophrenia descend over

a once well-ordered pattern of thought.

It is equally

disturbing in that relativism is not an acceptable
conclusion to critical thinking about political or social

discourse.

Instructors rightfully and willfully demand

answers to the puzzles—whatever the puzzles may be.

Bauer

and Bizzell are not only accurate, but I would say
compassionate, in their assumptions that students need to
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believe in something and that teachers need to offer a so-

called "way out" for those caught in the antifoundationalist void.

However, I would argue that offering students a variety

of choices within a topic is offering them an array of

ideologies to choose from and at least the freedom to argue

a variety of supportable standpoints—certainly this is a way
out of anti-foundationalism.

Although students' standpoints

will still only be provisionally true, students will at
least have explored the topic to the extent that they find a

girded authority in which to validate their positions,

whatever those positions may be.

In this construct,

students are still required to grapple with difficult and

provocative ideologies, while retaining the respect and

authority necessary to deconstruct positions that are
antithetical to their personal or political needs.

In this

way, instructors will in fact ask students to put their

beliefs on hold when they invite students into the polyvocal
arena of academic argumentation.

Instructors will also ask

that students defer judgment until they have a richer

understanding of the subject; however, authority is

validated, not by instructors agreeing with the students'

positions but instead by acknowledging the way students
support and construct valid arguments, regardless of any
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political affiliations they assume.

in concert with Bizzell, that "[.

And I would add here,

. .] a consensus can only

be achieved through collective participation in the

rhetorical process"

(673).

Yet, the instructor's—and

arguably the students'—rhetoric should at least attempt to

be equally effective on multiple fronts instead of "[. .
. ] openly exert [ing . ,. . ] authority [. .

.] to try to

persuade students to agree with [the instructor's] values"

(672).
"[.

.

Although Bizzell contends that open persuasion will

.] collectively generate trustworthy knowledge and

beliefs conducive to the common good"

(671), Bizzell's

position and Bauer's assume, without support, that they know

what is ideologically best for both our culture and our
students—positions that are fundamentally complicated and

diverse.

This is not to say, however, that instructors must stay
completely neutral on a topic, for at least to some extent,
this may be unrealistic.

Arguably, even if composition

instructors choose to incorporate contentious voices—as they
should—they may still end up indirectly championing their

own.

The question instead becomes, what can instructors do

to offer the richest environment possible for a fair and
rewarding interplay between contending theories?

C. H.

Knoblauch and Charles Paine—the other two scholars most
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indicted by Hairston—argue for similar reasons that the way

truths are constructed and deconstructed in the classroom is
perhaps the most important element for achieving a robust

and uninhibited debate.
Paine, on the one hand, champions the notion of
inculcating students into the teachers' ideologies:

[.

.

.] it is of course reasonable—if it is what

we believe—to try to inculcate into our students
the conviction that the dominant order is

repressive, that they should feel angered by the
injustices done to others, that an emancipatory
vision be formulated, and its praxis should be

exercised.

(564)

Yet, he qualifies the statement, suggesting that the harm in
such a position exists more in the way knowledge is

constructed than in the instructor's belief in a particular
ideology: "If [.

.

.] theorists [. .

.] truly believe all

structures of knowledge and evaluation are relative, they
must realize their vision for emancipation is also relative,
or [.

(563).

.

.] radically contingent on their personal economies"
Thus, according to Paine, "If we wish our students

to remain open-minded, we need to demonstrate our openness
to the ideas of students and others"

(564).

Knoblauch

offers a similar position on the persuasive power of
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instructors' ideologies and their limitations, when he
states,

.] since conversations seldom entail equal
/
distributions of power or authority, our speech

[.

.

may well have to be boldly denunciative at times
if it is to affect its hearers in the midst of
their intellectual and political comfort.

At the

same time, if we are not, like Pogo, to discover
that the enemy is us, we are also compelled to
review our choices and monitor our commitments,
scrupulously, not in their abstract sufficiency,

but in their "consequences" as we exercise them in
the world.

We are obliged to announce ourselves

so that, through the very process of self-

assertion, we grow more conscious of our axioms
and submit that awareness to public debate.

(139)

Therefore, both Knoblauch and Paine accept their "role[s] as

manipulator[s]"

(Paine 563) but with the caveat that

ideologies, especially the dominant (teacher's) ideologies,

must be transparent and subject to the same critical
attention as those the instructor is attempting to admonish

for their oppressive qualities.

Although I am personally

less comfortable with overtly manipulating students into

accepting my view as the correct view, I agree with
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Knoblauch's and Paine's positions insofar as they offer

students a critical model of acceptance and a constructive

way of doubting, because they treat knowledge as contingent,
changeable, and yet something to fight for.

Their positions

also address Hairston's concerns that leftist composition

instructors do nothing more than champion their own beliefs.

Instructors can potentially maintain political positions as
long as those instructors who do accept leftist constructs

are not so deeply entrenched in their own ideologies as to
support the notion that

[.

.

.] when students understand that they are

oppressed by the structure of capitalism, the

light bulb will turn on, and they will become
critical thinkers; that is, the development of

critical thinking skills is unnecessary because
the truth has been revealed to them.

(561)

On the contrary, to help students resist indoctrination—in
this case the hegemony of the classroom—instructors must

assume that "[.

.

.] emancipation conveys different visions

to different persons and groups, and the means to that

emancipation and what exactly it consists of must therefore
be explored during the'process of education"

(562).

Thus, to accept Bauer and Bizzell's view that feminism,

or any other ideological construct, is an acceptable
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ideological position for an entire class is to set one
socio-political theory above all others, to create a limited
and biased view on a topic, and to distrust the dialectic
process.

The position also assumes that instructors know

what is ideologically "best" for a varied group of

sophisticated adults with diverse experiences and needs-a

position that is itself oppressive and better left, I
believe, to the students themselves.

In these regards, if

instructors are to assume stances on subjects, in order to
overcome the seductive desire for the pots to call the

kettles black, instructors' positions need to be
"realistically" challenged to the extent—or perhaps more
so—than the other so-called oppressive theories that are

critically examined..

In this vein, instructors are not

forced to relinquish their ideological positions, nor are

they championing their cause to the detriment of their

students' critical needs; instead, they are simply forced to
challenge and support their own ideologies in the same ways

they ask of their students, and thus, model the very
processes they teach.
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CHAPTER THREE

EXPLICATING THE THEORY

Although levied at individual practitioners and
scholars, Hairston's claims indict social-epistemic rhetoric

as the cornerstone of instructors' political coercion in the

classroom.

Her concerns are at least partially justified,

given the practitioners she has represented—at least half of

whom, upon further study, openly supported not only the
desire but the right to foreground their political views in

the classroom and even to "manipulate" students into

agreeing with them.

However, the question remains whether

the theory connecting these practices rationalizes these
actions.

James Berlin's work with rhetoric and social and

political studies—in particular "Rhetoric and Ideology in

the Writing Class" and Rhetorics , Poetics, and Cultures—is

considered by many to be the center of social-epistemic
rhetoric.

Thus, this chapter will explicate these works in

order to decide whether social epistemic rhetoric pushes

instructors to practice political coercion in their
classrooms.

A quick overview of social-epistemic rhetoric places

political and social ideologies as the focus of study.
According to Berlin,
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Social-epistemic rhetoric is an alternative that
is self-consciously aware of its ideological
stand, making the very question of ideology the
center of classroom activities, and in so doing

providing itself a defense against preemption and
a strategy for self-criticism and self-correction.

("Rhetoric . .
478)
'
I
Berlin's justification for placing ideology at the center of
the writing class comes from his view that any rhetoric is

"[.

.

.] always already ideological"

(477).

As he explains

in chapterifive of Rhetorics, Poetics, and Cultures, "[.

.

..] no set of signifying practices, can lay claim to a
disintefested pursuit of transcendental truth; all are
engaged in the play of power and politics., regardless of

their intentions"

(77).

Because language is layered in

social currencies, no use of language can be considered
politically neutral.

Thus, the ways we study language in

classrooms, according to Berlin, would need to include an
analysis not only of the uses, forms, structures, and styles

of language but also the politics supporting those dominant
and recurring elements.

To state it more succinctly, Berlin

concludes that we need to study the ways we create, use, and
profit from language as well as the ways language (and,

therefore, the people, relationships, and systems who
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control and guard.it) use us.

In short, instead of ridding

language of ideology, he argues that we must recognize that

it is an inextricable component and make it a part of our
study.
On the other hand, Hairston posits that a writing class

should ,
[. . .. ] teach writing for its own sake, as a
primary intellectual activity, that is at the heart
of a college education [.

.

.

.] Writing courses,

especially required freshman courses, should not
be for anything or about anything other than

writing itself, and how one uses it to learn and
think and communicate.

(emphases Hairston 179)

To exemplify, Hairston creates a student-centered

environment, using "students' topics" to create

"multicultural" student writing in a safe environment (192).

Curiously, however, almost as an addendum, Hairston later
revisits these "student topics" and states that personal

writing is not enough, that a "broader range of discourse"

is necessary.
"[. .

Her suggested themes for the course include:

.] family or community rituals; power relationships at

all levels; the student's role in his or her family or
group; their roles as men and women; the myths they live by;
cultural tensions within groups"
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(193).

Even at a glance, the contradictions between Hairston's

theoretical position, the practical application of her
curriculum, and her condemnation of social-epistemic

For example, it seems unlikely that

rhetoric are glaring.

students could study men's and women's roles without
mentioning sexism.

Even a cursory examination of gender

reveals the potential for and justifications of unequal
power distributions within gender relationships.

Even more

difficult to reconcile are Hairston's claims that
compositionists need to move beyond personal writing but

without including any professional or academic writing.

As

Hairston suggests, "[. . .] the focus should be on writing,

not reading"
[.

(191).

.

She proceeds, saying that

.] we can help students articulate and

understand [their] experience, but we also have
the important job of helping every writer to

understand that each of us sees the world through
our own particular lens, one shaped by unique

experiences.

In order to communicate with others,

we must learn to see through their lenses as well

as try to explain to them what we see through

ours.

(192)

Within this context, it appears both logical and necessary

to include a variety of perspectives, both students' and
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other writers', for the reasons that Hairston states and for

the well-documented connection between writing and reading.

Indeed, understanding our own as well as others' lenses

seems to invite just the kind of study of1 ideology Berlin
describes.

Yet, Hairston hedges.

A final contradiction,

however, and perhaps the most important, exists in
Hairston's denial of social-epistemic rhetoric in the

classroom, while still proffering parts of it as an example

for a course theme.

Obviously, she finds social-

constructionism (the root of social-epistemology) a worthy
theoretical construct—at least she attempts to practice

it—and clearly discussions of power relationships are
endemic to social-epistemology; yet, she claims that a

classroom should remain politically and ideologically
neutral, both ’from the teacher's standpoint and from the
topic's standpoint.

According to Hairston, we can study

anything, read anything, discuss anything—including politics
and ideologies—if, and only if, the topic(s) are generated
and sustained by the students' interests.

This is not only

impractical and naive, but it is also antithetical to any

college or university's description of FYC as an
introduction to academic writing.

In short, although

Hairston's curriculum would, as she claims, create a

potentially safe place for students to compose, her attempts
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to practically establish an ideologically-neutral classroom
seem flawed, not only by their practical and theoretical

contradictions but by what appears to be a misunderstanding

of social-epistemic rhetoric and its goals.

In reference to social-epistemic rhetoric, Hairston

states that
Those who want to bring their ideology into the
classroom argue that since any classroom is

necessarily political, the teacher might as well
make it openly political and ideological.

He or

she should be direct and honest about his or her

political beliefs; then the students will know

where they stand and everyone can talk freely.
(189)

These statements imply that any study of political and
social positions is necessarily-a study of the instructor's
ideology.

Furthermore, according to Hairston, studying

ideology is then necessarily reduced to a battle of wills

between^the instructor and the students.

A closer look at

social-epistemic rhetoric maintains almost a direct
opposition to Hairston's understanding.

According to

Berlin,;
[.

.

.] instead of rhetoric acting as the

transcendental recorder or arbiter of competing
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ideological claims, rhetoric is regarded as always
This position means that any

already ideological.

examination of a rhetoric must first consider the

ways its very discursive structure can be read so
as to favor one version of economic, social, and

political arrangements over other versions.

A

rhetoric then considers competing claims in these

three realms from an ideological perspective made
possible both by its,constitution and by its

application—the dialectical interaction between
the rhetoric as text and the interpretive

practices brought to it.

("Rhetoric .

.

477)

To break this down, Berlin posits that rhetoric itself is
situated within and therefore acting for (and against) a

confluence of political or social interests.

In other

words, the power play and economic exchange between

convictions is what facilitates the need for the rhetoric in
the first place.

To accept any truth, even the lens through

which one attempts to establish truth, is to indirectly

portray one set of beliefs as more correct, useful, or
perhaps better than another.

Thus, the first step in

understanding the rhetoric is to ask, in terms of power, who

or what do particular rhetorical conventions seem to favor?
Endemic to that process is an exploration of how its forms,
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structures, and patterns attempt to serve its purposes.

For

example, Berlin claims that "[. .. .] the rhetoric of

cognitive psychology refuses the ideological question,

resting secure instead in its scientific examination of the
composing process"

(483).

Yet, he suggests that

It is possible, however, to see this rhetoric as

being eminently suited to appropriation by the
proponents of a particular ideological stance, a

stance consistent with the modern college's

commitment to preparing students for the world of
corporate capitalism.

(483)

The class' study, therefore, is to discover whether

cognitive rhetorical patterns shape the relationship between
higher education and corporate culture.

Although Berlin

proffers a potential conclusion to the study: that cognitive

rhetoric supports the fallacy that "The existent, the good,
and the possible are inscribed in the very nature of things

as indisputable scientific facts, rather than being seen as
humanly devised social constructions always remaining open

to discussion"

(485), this conclusion remains tentative and

open, as only one of many competing ideologies in a forum of
other contentious theories.

Other theories, if adequately

supported, become, at least hypothetically, true to the
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extent that they function to establish and support a
particular interplay of power relationships.
Within this socially-constructed public arena,
ideologies, including the lens through which the positions

are studied, "[.

.

.] provide [.

.

.] a defense against

preemption and a strategy for self-criticism and self

correction"

(478).

Thus, Hairston's claim that social-

epistemology suggests "[. .

.] any teacher should be free to

use his dr her classroom to promote any ideology"

seems myopic.

(189)

Given the necessity to foreground the

ideology inherent in any claim, the instructor's claims, if
promoted, must be discussed and fall under the same

scrutiny.

For example, to use one of Hairston's topics—that

she claims represents the "logic of the cultural left"
(189)—abortion can in fact be discussed without the

instructor's position preempting the students'.

For

example, if the instructor believes and puts forth the

argument that anti-abortion laws relegate women to social
vessels to be manipulated by patriarchal notions of
"family," the "truth" of the argument, according to the ways

it is studied, must resist conclusion based on individual
belief or desire.

Its accuracy or primacy depends instead

on the critical'understanding of who benefits socially and
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economically from that position and the justifications on
which the argument relies.

To take it a step further, the instructor's position
may be different from the students' given the difference in

power between the instructor and the students, the
allegiances and duties each attaches to-and fulfills within
the academy, and the individual cultural and political

currencies that inform their positions.

Although students

can in any situation potentially mimic the instructor's

ideology, if their critiques are conducted with a firm
understanding of social-epistemology, they have little

choice but to analyze the topic from multiple situations,

including the instructor's and their own, and come to

somewhat different conclusions based on their uniquely
situated locations.

Social-epistemology, if it holds to its

theoretical aims, attempts to complicate any ownership of
"truth," including the instructor's.

Hence, Hairston's

question, "Can't any professor claim the right to
indoctrinate students simply because he or she is right?"

(189), becomes moot. "Truth" is established not according to

a particular ideological position but as an understanding of
the way the position is constructed and maintained through

relationships.

Ideologies thus become transient and

situated, or, as Berlin states, "imbricated," i.e. layered

4,9

in the particular relational lenses through which they are’
studied.

This understanding complicates Hairston's position that
"[.

.

.]■ diversity and ideology will not flourish together
By definition, they're incompatible"(189), which

seems to be her justification for her claim that "[.
[instructors] shouldn't even have to mention [.

.

. .] we

.

political topics such as] racism and sexism in our society—

that's a given, as is our commitment to work to overcome it"

(188). Diversity, by definition, assumes multiple
perspectives on any given position.

Multiple perspectives

assume multiple voices; otherwise, the dialogue is silenced
before it even begins.

Thus, diversity exists fundamentally

on voiced ideologies, however naturalized those ideologies

may at first appear.

According to Berlin,

Ideology always brings with it strong social and
cultural reinforcement, so that what we take to

exist, to have value, and to be possible seems
necessary, normal, and inevitable—in the nature of
things.

This goes for power as well, since

ideology naturalizes certain authority

regimes—those of class, race, and gender, for
example—and renders alternatives all but
unthinkable.

In this way, it determines
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■

who can act and what can be accomplished.

Finally, ideology is minutely inscribed in the

discourse of daily practice, where it emerges as

pluralistic and conflicted.

(Rhetorics .

. . 78)

Contrary to Berlin, Hairston's position assumes that
all people understand inherently what is culturally just and

unjust and that we all have some kind of built-in locating
device that will naturally ferret out the multiple ways that
societies and individuals produce, reproduce, and extend
cultural injustice.

As they apply to the intersection of

FYC and social-epistemic rhetoric, cultural power structures

are, like any other power structures, rooted in firm
convictions and the language that delivers them, both of

which are difficult to discover, to understand from multiple
perspectives, and to resist if necessary.

Social-epistemic

rhetoric, as Berlin describes it, accepts this position and
attempts to complicate the understanding by uncovering the
relationships in terms of who benefits and in what ways.

Thus, the result of this kind of examination, although

complex and multifaceted, is not, as Hairston suggests, to
establish a hierarchy of ideologies—with the instructor's on

top—but to critically examine and understand "[.

.

.] the

subtle effects of signifying practices as key to egalitarian
decision making"

(79).

And because FYC assumes at least
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part of the responsibility for facilitating this kind of
exploration and critical inquiry at a level appropriate for'

college and university study, to alienate the instructor

from this process is in essence to foreground any

justification offered by students, regardless of its
irrationality, as correct.

Thus, we renege on our

responsibility as instructors to teach the skills necessary
for developing critical thinking not only in a post
secondary educational setting but also in a diverse
democracy, in which diverse and contentious views are

constantly in disagreement.
From this perspective, social-epistemology's bias is

not located in its advocacy of one political or social

theory over another.

In other words a social-epistemic

study of patriarchy or feminism would not automatically

place patriarchy as the more oppressive of the two.

It

assumes instead that all social relationships are constantly
struggling for power, and they therefore benefit some to the
detriment of others.

A., social-epistemic study would in fact

work to-discover who benefits and how those benefits are

socially and politically maintained and signified.

Thus,

Hairston's claims that social-epistemology favors leftist

ideologies are difficult to justify, especially given the

shift in power that-Is necessary to facilitate a productive
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study.

Yet, the practitioners she invokes to rationalize

her claims do in fact violate protocol.

This very real

contradiction suggests that something about social-epistemic
rhetoric or the way in which the theory is read potentially

leads to an imbalanced treatment of political and social

topics in FYC.

Traditional power dynamics established

between .students and teachers may, however, contribute to

the dilemma.

As stated earlier, according to social epistemologists,

language is social and therefore political, and the
relationships involved in a language exchange, because they

are ultimately political, are defined by power struggles,

and those power struggles benefit some and relegate others

to inferior and oppressed positions in the social structure.
Because of this, a social-epistemic inquiry into language

will study not only language but the political and social

influences impinging upon it.

Given the nature of this kind

of inquiry, power in the classroom needs to shift from the
instructor to the community, because the focus of what

function language is serving changes.

The student should no

longer be impelled to ask the teacher, "Is this right?"

Instead, the student and the instructor must ask, "What or

whom does this convention serve? and how?"
.

As a result, "[.

.] the responses of an audience are never totally
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predictable, never completely in the control of the sender

of a coded message or of the coded message itself"

(83-84).

This necessarily upsets the perceived authority of the

instructor and, consequently, the perceived authority of the

audience, two positions that are imbued with very specific
amounts of social currencies.
Furthermore, even without the lens of social-epistemic

rhetoric guiding the class, as established in the preceding

chapters, instructors in composition courses studying
argumentation through political ideologies must work to
resist conclusions until a full and inclusive study

justifies them.

Instead, what often happens is the adoption

of what'Linda Brodkey calls a "commonsensical pedagogy":

"The commonsense view of language and composition makes any
pedagogical practice that exceeds policing student language

suspicious because it challenges a hierarchy wherein others
claim the right to discipline student thought"

(200) .

Although I believe the position to be somewhat naive-

compos it ionists do in fact share the responsibility of
influencing student language and thought—the ways in which

we influence language and. thought are critical to

establishing either a productive or reductive understanding

of argumentation and language as weil.
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Brodkey makes an important distinction between

productive and reductive criticism—one that stays in line

with social-epistemic rhetoric's goals—when she states,
Frankly, I do not much care whether students
believe the arguments that writers lay out against

the absolute objectivity of objectivity, but I do

care whether they give these arguments as well as
those written from other unfamiliar perspectives a

full hearing.

I care for a number of reasons,

foremost among them that I understand the critique
of received wisdom to be if not the only at least

one of the most important purposes of scholarship.
In order to ensure that students at least hear
what those who argue that their vested interests
are not served by common-sense versions of

objectivity or difference have to say, we have

privileged what I see as an academically

responsible version of argumentation over other

forms of argumentation and other forms of writing.
(emphasis Brodkey 201)
In this ;vein, students are required to listen to,

understand, and incorporate arguments, some of which will be
antithetical to their versions of the "truth" of the

argument, and the responsibility of the instructor is to
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interpolate to what extent those positions have been

evaluated and used to justify the conclusion.

The

instructor's authority is then necessarily resituated to
view and judge the support sustaining the argument instead

of merely the conclusion the student accepts as true.
Juxtaposing this understanding with Bauer's class from the

previous chapter, feminism does not have to be a reductive
argument.

Rather, Bauer focused more on the conclusion—that

students needed to accept feminist theory as a viable

alternative to patriarchy—instead of evaluating the

students' support and the ways in which it led to their
conclusions.

As Berlin states on. the same subject, " [. .

.J

the different forms that patriarchy assumes in different

social classes make for correspondingly different patterns
of behavior and consequences for power and privilege"
(Rhetorics 84).

As a result, different readings are not

only possible but necessary for a full understanding of the

topic. In terms of Bauer's class, instead of asking her
students what led them to reject feminism, she assumed it
was their entrenched and somewhat benighted positions within

the patriarchy that forced the rejection, which may in .fact

be true,: but it is her responsibility to complicate the
position only to the extent that students use that
information accurately within their arguments.

56

If they

merely reject the information without incorporating it, then

her reading may be accurate.

If they incorporate it, then

refute it, that argument—at least in theory—is justifiable,

sound, and the democratic goal of sustained critical inquiry
is performed in an ethical and educational manner.

In

short, -Bauer's responsibility regarding secondary curricula
in the FYC classroom’is not to teach students feminism but

to teach ways of critiquing academic, political, and social

theories, which in her case happen to be studying feminism
and patriarchy.

In this way, the instructors maintain a

governing authority over the ways arguments are formed and

supported but subsequently relinquish authority over what is

correct1and incorrect regarding the topic of inquiry.

Consequently, social-epistemic rhetoric retains its

integrity as a constructive way of critiquing a topic
instead of reducing the argument to binary judgments of what

is correct and incorrect.
I
As often occurs, difficult theories offer a variety of
interpretations, and those interpretations become even more

awkward'when enacted in practical situations.

Social-

epistemic rhetoric is certainly no exception, as its
position is not only complex but also proposes a

restructuring of classroom authority and propels students
and instructors into the potentially uncomfortable situation

57

of critiquing their own allegiances to political and social
institutions and traditions. As often happens, any critique

of politics and normative behaviors is dismissed as radical
and liberal, which is what I believe Hairston's
generalizations imply.

Yet, as Berlin explains, this is a

much more egalitarian way to create an informed society with
citizens who are not only able to understand but also to

criticize and act on social and political injustices.

As it

pertains to the specific responsibilities of FYC in

facilitating critical inquiry, social-epistemic rhetoric
lays the groundwork for students and instructors to explore
and critique their relationships within a given framework
without forcing them to accept particular ideological
positions.

Although it is possible for demagogues to usurp

its platform in the name of "truth" and "justice," if

understood in its scope and function, social-epistemology

provides a practical and theoretical environment conducive

to studying and critiquing such claims.

The theory, then,

holds up to criticism but, due to its subject matter—society
and politics—may offer certain political platforms the
illusion of safety for espousing their lop-sided political
convictions.

This, danger, however, is inherent in any

J

theory and its application.

To ignore the politics of

language and rhetoric is to assume that both are neutral in
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their functions, a platform inimical to a complex
understanding of either.

This, too, is a political stance

and is no less coercive or reactionary.

Rhetoric, as Berlin

explains, was founded on its political and social functions
in fifth century Athens.
political.

Its uses today are no less

To understand its influence and service in

argumentation is therefore no less important to us than it

was to serving a functional democracy in ancient Greece.

To

disallow students the opportunity and therefore the
responsibility to act within this arena is to disallow them

access to their roles in the university and in society,
roles that they are repeatedly told rely specifically on
their active involvement.
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CHAPTER FOUR
CONCLUSIONS

The bulk of this thesis maintains that FYC is in fact a
suitable environment for political discussions, as long as

those discussions are treated fairly and critically, and as
long as instructors make a significant shift from

traditional patterns of authority.

As explained earlier,

composition instructors have a greater amount of authority
over primary curricula, to the extent that they presumably
know what conventions are acceptable within the academy and

why.

I would add here that a certain amount of negotiation

is possible and necessary in this area, as well; however,
most practitioners agree that, with elements such as grammar

and format, productive negotiation can only occur after
certain conventions are understood.

Secondary curricula, on

the other hand, must be authorized to a greater extent by
the audience, with ideological positions critiqued by both
students and instructors.

In order to do so, as explained

in detail in chapter two, FYC classrooms need to nourish an

anti-foundational approach to knowledge.

Fundamental to

this position, multiple perspectives on any social or
political topics must be reviewed for a full and robust
ideological debate.
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The importance, of a vibrant debate over ideologies,
however,' should not stop with FYC.

Perhaps of greater

magnitude, composition scholars must maintain the same open

mindedness to political discussions within the discipline.
As discussed throughout, Hairston's position, although

politically motivated, offers an important critique that
composition must incorporate into the discussion.

Her

insistence that composition is being overrun by leftist
ideologies, although greatly overgeneralized, has some

merit, as chapter two demonstrates.

Thus, composition

scholars, instead of rejecting the .position outright, need
to understand what productive contribution her claims might
offer.

Oh the other hand, Hairston's heated charge to

cleanse composition discourse of all political interests is

not only naive but near-sighted in its objectives, and

instead;of supporting an all or nothing position, it must

incorporate the reality of impinging political forces.

Both, therefore, maintain stalwart positions that miss the
point of what it means to teach people how to think

critically within political and social environments.

FYC

and composition scholarship must address political
influences openly and head-on if either expects to be taken
seriously.
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Foremost in that address is a closer look at the
separation many scholars and practitioners support between

essay content and forms.

In the first chapter, I draw

similar distinctions between primary and secondary curricula

in order to demonstrate the change in classroom authority
necessary to diminish the potential for ideological
coercion.

To maintain this distinction further, however,

reduces language to a separation of disconnected parts—a
reduction that, if sustained, promotes the incongruence this

thesis proposes to help reduce.

The desire to condense

writing into easily codified parts negates the confluence of
form, function, and content.

Although sometimes necessary

to demystify the myriad complications with which writers and
instructors struggle, all', writing, even the most personal,
functions to- convey its content.

As attempts to subvert

hegemonic forms constantly invoke truculent and turbulent
rebuttal, content is necessarily tied to its patterns of
delivery, or its forms.

Thus, the three—function, form, and

content—entwine inextricably to the point that to exclude
any one fails to address the others.
Historically, however, many composition scholars and

practitioners insist on isolating one to the detriment of

others.

The tired emphasis on delineating modes of

discourse is one such example that still greatly influences
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students' thoughts about writing.

The fact that students

often query writing through such questions as "What kind of
paper is this?" shows the myopic lens such distinctions, if

they are maintained, promote.

If we look at the

implications of this question in greater detail, function is

implied but dissembled within the form; content is all but
ignored.

If students assume they are writing persuasive

papers (as a kind of essay), most often they are referring
to proving an argument.

Even if students are writing

propaganda or an assignment that includes a marketing
scheme, persuasion means first producing an angle, then

justifying the position (with an argument) that'attempts to
become structurally, meaningfully, and aesthetically
accepting to an audience.

To continue using modal

terminology, the "persuasive paper" will also require some
level of description, and that description may rely on a
comparative analysis of divergent interests.

Although the

essay requires facility with multiple elements, the question

the student is asking maintains a distinction that excludes
the complexity necessary to proficiently handle the writing
situation.

The question, therefore, is not so much what

kind of:writing writers do but what function(s) the form(s)
and content serve.
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As an old poet once told me, "Writing is a subversive
act."

Writers are always working for audience acceptance by

attempting to change what the audience thinks.

As Berlin

explains, this interaction is political and necessarily

influenced by the content of the essay.

Yet, as Linda

Brodkey states,
It is in pedagogy that teachers articulate a nexus

of language, thought, and reality that is often

ignored (as not the content of composition) or
deferred (until students have learned the rules)

in the visible curriculum.

(193)

To many, the scope of composition only includes a
maintenance of forms.

However, this position excludes

writers/ choices—as it separates form from its

functions—while also sustaining the egregious claim that
writing has nothing to do with what is being written, a
position I find shamefully inept, especially when our

students continuously remind us of its limitations.

For almost four years, I have been working with student
writers in CSUSB's Writing Center.

In that time, although I

have seen many tutors and students come and go, one element
remains consistent.

Students often insist that writing can

be reduced to right and wrong.

Grammatical conventions,

syntax, argumentative structure, rhetoric, even stylistics,
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according to the way students ask about writing, fit neatly

into a binary.

The binary confirms a relationship that

leads new writers to conclude that writing functions solely

to please instructors and that rhetoric and argumentation

are somehow owned by instructors and professional writers.

This understanding negates the authority that FYC attempts
to help students find, because it sustains the illogical

conclusion that what students write will have no "real"
effect on anyone but their instructors and their grades.

Students' acceptance of such doctrines, I believe, results

directly from English instructors', like Hairston's,
insistence that students learn conventions without either

explaining or exploring why such conventions exist and how
they work to affect an audience.

Thus, students are left

with only a partial understanding of the writing

environment, and instructors are left mystified and angry
over the "laziness" they constantly encounter in students'
texts.

Although by no means the final word, the arguments laid

out in this treatise suggest possible ways of allowing
students to experience complex writing situations while

exercising authority over the content and forms of their
writing, without jeopardizing the integrity of a complex

writing experience.

Fundamental to that integrity, however,
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is a synthesis of function, form, and content and an
understanding of how writing instructors should establish

and relinquish authority within those elements.

As I tell

my students every semester, my goal is their independence,

but their independence is determined by their understanding

of their responsibilities as writers with an audience.
Students often resist, but through their resistence, they

find, realistically, what works and what does not, based on

very real and visible responses from their audience.

And

that response is only possible when I make my position

visible and tie my comments to the content of their essays.

For example, when I make a claim that a student's rhetoric

sounds accusatory and may work to shut down the acceptance
of the point, or if I claim that the counter-argument is
necessary and obvious for supporting a particular position,
I also make the claim public and attempt to achieve

consensus.

And I should note here that sometimes the class

sees the situation differently, and I am forced to
renegotiate my position openly, providing the same support
that I expect students to offer.
This is not to say that I or any instructor should

relinquish total control over a class.

Reflecting

accurately, at least according to the students who voice
their opinions about my classes, I establish authority based
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on the support I offer for my claims, just as I expect
students to do with theirs.

My credibility as an instructor

therefore depends on my lived experience as a writer and the
extent to which I can create realistic writing experiences

for students.

The most notable contribution, as per

students' comments, is when I "open their eyes to the
complexity of the world around them."

This comment reflects

not only the theoretical implications that this thesis lays

out but more importantly that the theory is made visible in
practice, as it inextricably links content, form, and
function.

In short, what students say becomes entwined with

how they say it; both are dependent on what functions their
writing serve and how those functions are interpreted by a
very real audience.

And after some time in this

environment, students often begin to preface their writing
questions with an explanation of why they made a certain
move in their essays.

Unlike the questions at the beginning

of this chapter, the preface along with the question implies

authority and reasoning and suggests that students are
beginning to see their choices in response to others.

At

that point, I smile and instead of giving them a rule to
follow, I ask them instead why they are concerned about the

move they made.

Most often they know the implications, so I
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tell them to leave it only if they are comfortable with the
consequences of the particular move or statement.

More to the point, however, if the students' questions
are ideological, and if the students persist in asking if

the ideologies are "right or wrong," the only answer I feel
justified offering is in the form of a question, "What do.

you think so and so (whomever we are reading at the time)
would say in response to your claim?"

This question is

possible only if the class is situated between complex,

diverse, and competing ideological platforms.

To situate

Hairston's Malawi student in this arena, similar questions
can only be handled stylistically and grammatically; the
content, however, cannot be challenged, as the audience

remains ignorant to the larger political or social context.

Although Hairston's exercise can potentially work to teach
narrative pacing or vivid description, it fails in its
attempts to make writing "necessary" in a larger context,

because the audience is only able to enter the conversation
on the level of form.

Content and function become vague and

fictionalized, as the separation of writing elements is

maintained.
This is not to say that students' personal experiences

are unimportant.

I would argue that they are fundamental

but only in relation to others, especially given students'
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insistence on overgeneralizing the importance of personal

experience.

As discussed in chapter two, students often see

personal exceptions in any theory; the logical move then is

to assume that personal experience is key to reconciling

issues of debate.

Although logical to an extent, the move

evades complexity and excludes audience and purpose.
Students' task in any genre of writing is at the very least

to negotiate a confluence of perspectives or voices.

Even

the most personal writing hinges on conflict and thereby
establishes a relationship of competing interests.

As I

established previously, students need to negotiate their own
position in regards to these other interests, then include
them to the degree that they influence the position, then
restructure the position based on that synthesis.

This

pattern should not seem foreign to anyone in the writing
profession, as it mirrors 19th century German philosopher

Georg Hegel's dialectic pattern of thesis, antithesis, and

synthesis.

Yet, as soon as the interaction is described as

"political," writing scholars and practitioners often hedge,

calling the position, as Hairston does, "leftist" and

reacting by subtracting the meaning of writing from its

forms, while consequently promoting the near-sighted and
limited view of academic writing as a perfunctory exercise

of memorizing forms.
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Although imbued with social and political tension,
composition studies must not allow its position to influence

its function to the degree that it excludes what it is asked
to accomplish.

As is, its anti-foundational position

situates it perfectly for the kind of robust debate

necessary to offer students a holistic view of language and

the topics conveyed by its use.

This position must be

maintained if instructors are to facilitate the practices
necessary to allow students access to an active
participation in their post-secondary education.

Basic-

skills instruction, expressivism, depoliticizing the
classroom, or a separation of any elements that influence

writing not only lead to a limited view of the writing
experience but disallow students the chance to engage
writing in realistic, complex, and diverse situations.

Any

one of these, as I have emphasized throughout this essay,
also reduces ideologies to entrenched "political" positions
without the critical facility necessary to sustain or debunk

them.
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